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James Kurth

The Common Defense and theWorld
Market

TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS WITNESSED THE Culmination

THE

of

econ

and

national
the global
between
security
wars wonder
two
In
half
of
the
world
the
first
century,
omy.
on
minds
of
the
of
the
concentrated
governments
primacy
fully
In the second half of the century, one government
national
security.
the tension

another

after

was

to accept

persuaded

the primacy

of

the global

economy. The collapse of theWarsaw Pact marked the decisive
retreat of the last great power that had been resisting the spread of the
economy.

global

As we

enter

of our century,

the last decade

it seems

that the epic struggle between national security and the global
economy may be coming
the former to the latter.

to an end, with

the decisive

submission

of

The tension between national security and the global economy has
been

evident

tures

in Asia

for many
reflected
centuries,
and Africa
and the Spanish

in the Portuguese
adven
in the New
adventures

had devel
century, national monarchies
By the seventeenth
a
mo
broad
of
chartered
acts,
array
instruments?navigation
oped
state
state
and
which
the
drew
arsenals, among others?by
nopolies,

World.1

benefits from a growing global trade. By the eighteenth century, these
had

been
we

which

institutionalized
know

into

a systematic

theory

seen as a systematic
is usually
in the interests of national
producers

Mercantilism
domestic
chapter
engaged
James
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and

practice,

as mercantilism.
policy

of
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security.
national
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in a lively international
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military

and

security

international

trade went

together,

linked by the

search for economic efficiency. That link has persisted through the
vast transformations brought on by the IndustrialRevolution and by
the globalization
RESPONDING

of the world

TO THE

economy.

INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION

Over

the centuries,
national
have framed their policies
governments
to
in response
their need for security and economic welfare.
On the
eve of the Industrial Revolution,
all the great powers
of the time?

under the control
Prussia, and Russia?were
dominated
mercantilist
In those
by
policies.
national
indistin
circumstances,
security and economic welfare were
a
of
different
There
how
were,
aspects
single objective.
guishable,

Britain, France, Austria,
of monarchies
and were

in degree among the five powers. The state in
ever, great differences
was
least authoritarian
and the parliament most
which
the monarchy
was Britain;
autonomous
Britain was also the state in
accordingly,
the economy was
least controlled
which
by the state, entrepreneurs
were under the least restraints,
and foreign trade was most
promi
nent.

one

As

Prussia,
ist and

eastward

moved

and Russia

the monarchy

Britain

from

to France,
more

became
successively
more mercantilist.2

Austria,
absolut

the economy
successively
Revolution
Industrial
reinforced
the differences
the
along
a
was
to
first systemat
West-East
continuum,
pattern that
according
In
the
first
articulated
Alexander
Gerschenkron.3
industrial
by
ically
The

izing state, Great

business

Britain,

enterprises

led the transformation.

Having nothing to fear from international competition in industrial
the British

products,

soon

abandoned

the mercantilist

approach

and

developed the doctrine and policy of free trade. Industrialization also
in military
in naval
competition,
particularly
trade was seen, therefore, as contributing
both to
were
case
in any
and to economic welfare, which
inseparably

advantages
Global
development.
brought

security

linked.
Later

industrializing

states

faced more

formidable

economic

and

military problems. For one thing, lacking the shielding from enemies
were obliged
to maintain
large
enjoyed from the sea, they
was
to compete
not
in
In
that
order
but
armies;
enough.

that Britain
standing

to
or to prevail
in military
conflicts,
they needed
foreign markets
was
to find
One urgent need
the early industrializers.
catch up with
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large amounts of capital in a short time for
plants.

For France

a

this meant

and Prussia,

banking system closely linked to the state; and for Russia and Japan,
the state

until they achieved
itself. Meanwhile,
their goal of catch-up,
to
for their infant indus
these countries
needed
provide protection
tries. Consequently,
free
doctrines
trade, they developed
eschewing

and policies for guiding the development of the national economy.
the role of the state as the arbiter between
therefore,
and economic
efficiency was at its lowest in Britain
to the east. Further
to the
in Russia
and at its highest

Inside Europe,
national
security

to the west,
in the United
west,
And

to

further

limited.
States, the role of the state was even more
in Japan,
the east,
the state exercised
extensive

in bringing
about economic
development.
to build a strong navy reinforced
the need

authority
necessity

In Japan,
the
for government

support of rapid industrialization in heavy industry.
The first half of the twentieth century would be one of the most
eras

tumultuous
security

inmost

in world
countries

that period,
concern. But

history.
During
became a dominant

national
itwas

not

until after the close ofWorld War II in 1945 that the relative roles of
governments
continuum.

With

changed

in these

countries,

the West-East

disturbing

the defeat of Germany and Japan, and the exhaustion of

four of the great powers were
France,
status
to
states. The
great power
merely
being major
the United
States and the Soviet Union, were elevated
of superpower.
The new West Germany
allowed
for

Britain

and

demoted

from

remaining
to the new

two,
rank

far less govern
direction
of the economy
for purposes
of national
security than
now
had the old Germany.
the
in
United
States,
Conversely,
engaged
a long Cold War,
tolerated
somewhat more direction
from the state

ment

than it had

in the past. And Japan, while
retaining
a completely
its economy,
developed

direction

of

national

security.

SECURING
When

THE DEFENSE

national

policy

INDUSTRIAL

makers

have

strong government
new definition
of

BASE

seen

the global

economy

as a

threat to the security of the national defense industrial base, they have
a variety of
employed
policy responses. Borrowing
in the Friedberg
as
I see their responses
essay,

from

the analysis
into three
falling
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measures
of protection,
such as
providing
measures
as
of
such
providing
subsidies;
promotion,
measures
of prevention,
such as export controls.
groups:

Policies

of protection
seem
It might

enough.
choice for governments
the Moravcsik
essay

import barriers;
and developing

sense are familiar
in the narrow,
traditional
that protection
would
be an obvious
policy
to secure their defense
industrial base. Yet, as
have often pur
demonstrates,
governments

in other countries
if these were demon
produced
to
at
those
home.
strably superior
produced
When
the military
services of course
choosing
foreign weapons,
have been opposed
the
In conflicts
domestic
weapons
by
producers.
chased

weapons

between

and business
national
governments
military
organizations,
In such cases,
have
the military.
the global
generally
supported
has been seen as reinforcing
national
economy
security.
to buy abroad has undergone
But the willingness
of governments
cycles

In the immediate

of change.

aftermath

the Napoleonic Wars, World War
governments

have

been more

inclined

of great wars,

I, and World War
to buy

including

II, national

from national

sources.

In such periods, there has been an especially large defense industrial
left over

As a great war
has
expansion.
sector has tended to lose
into the past, however,
receded
the defense
its economic
it easier for the military
services to
importance, making
return to the international
Even in normal
market.
times, however,
some governments
to protect
have been more
inclined
than others

base

from

the wartime

base. As Christopher
Davis
relates, the Soviet
case
extreme
the
of
government
represented
protection
even at the cost of ruining its civilian and commercial
and promotion,
to
industry. But France and Japan have also been strongly disposed
their defense

Union

industrial

has

it isworth noting,
protect their defense
industry. These two countries,
are the two capitalist powers with
the strongest
tradition of govern
ment guidance
of the economy,
the "strong states" of the compara
to find that they are also
tive politics
literature. So it is not surprising
a national
the most
the countries with
explicit plans for developing
structure appropriate
for their national
security.
an especially
in the Samuels essay, represents
Japan, as described
case of linking national development
to national
remarkable
security.
In the first decades of Japan's industrialization,
the Japanese govern

ment actively promoted the "indigenization" of technology, along with
a national defense industry.This provided themodel for an industrial
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civilian

and commercial

production

from

the

1950s to the 1980s, the government incidentally brought Japan's
industry to a state that has served especially well
era of high-technology,
electronics-based
weapons

in the contemporary
systems.

leading example of a policy of prevention has been the

The

and

development

of national

implementation

export

controls.

Gov

ernments have applied such policies only infrequently in peacetime.
But as the Mastanduno

essay

recounts,

policies hard afterWorld War
elaborate
munist

the United

States pushed

such

II, persuading its allies to join in an

controls
directed
the com
system of multilateral
against
war
bloc. These
"the American
of
economic
controls,
style

fare," had their origins inWorld War IIandwere readily carried over
into the Cold War. The intensity and duration of the Cold War
institutionalized

US

the era of economic

controls

export

so that they persisted
even into
Even before the Gulf War
aborted

globalization.
to develop
attempt

of mass destruction,
weapons
systematic
over
were
of
of
control
the
nuclear
weapons
systems
proliferation
on
and proposals
the books,
for the control
of chemical
already
were well advanced. There is evidence that the United States
weapons
Iraq's

will

continue

to promote

such controls

long after

the Cold War

has

been

forgotten.
These disparate national
contexts.
larger national

THE UNITED

policies,

however,

STATES: THE LIBERAL

need

to be seen in their

STATE

The 1940s were the heroic age of US foreign policy. The United States
first achieved an epic triumph inWorld War II and then set about to
a new world

order in its own image. This new order was a
of
of Gramscian
self-interest,
splendid
example
enlightened
"hege
a
or
in which
of its
conceives
power creatively
mony,"
leading class
own self-interest
in terms so broad and so generous
that it brings the
assent of those that it leads. Even today, when much of this
willing
structure
has fallen
into ruins and its foundations
have greatly
of the original architecture
the grandeur
still inspires awe.
eroded,
create

International
The

new

Liberalism
American

and Extended
order

embraced

Deterrence
two

central

concepts,

one

applying to the global economy, the other to global security. The
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global

economy

was

to be based

the

upon

idea of

international

liberalism: liberal states, particularly those inNorth America and
Western

would

Europe,

support

market

in an open

forces

interna

tional economy. This might be termed the GATT model, after the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was established in
1948. Global security was to be based upon the idea of extended
to respond with nuclear
is, a collective
undertaking
to any Soviet attack on the United
States or on
if necessary
that

deterrence,
weapons

the territory of its allies. This might be termed the NATO model,
after theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established
in 1949.
two

The

concepts

of

liberalism

international

and

extended

deter

thus filled out the

rence, the two models of GATT and NATO,

of the new international
order. For
and security dimensions
more
have taken them for granted,
than four decades, Americans
truth."
almost as if they were "self-evident
no more
But, in fact, these two concepts
together have represented
economic

an Atlantic

than

perception

of

a world

order.

The

of

concepts

international liberalism and extended deterrence developed out of the
in the areas within

conditions

the US-led

Atlantic

areas

alliance,

that

dominated the global economy and world politics afterWorld War
II. As we
economic

have

seen, both

and security
of "the hundred

century
and World

War

I. True,

before World War
role

the war,

after

concepts

in the earlier

had been prefigured
of Britain,
especially

the
during
policies
Wars
the
between
years peace"
Napoleonic
such policies
Britain was already abandoning

II. But as the United States assumed the British
it also

some

assumed

of

the

ideas

historically

identifiedwith the Pax Britannica; ideas that came readily to nations
strong navies.4
States
that the United

and

liberal polities,
economies,
and military
economic
The
advantages
reinforced
in
the
years
early postwar
enjoyed

with

commercial

these historical

legacies.

In the late 1940s, the United States accounted for 50 percent of the
world's

industrial

output,

and was

the world

leader

in high-technol

ogy products and high-productivity processes. In addition, in 1945
the United

a monopoly
of naval
preponderance

States

overwhelming
a happy condition,

had

and an
weapons
in such
For a country
deterrence
and extended

in nuclear
forces.

liberalism
international
no other country was
of
choice.
Besides,
policies
for an alternative.
press strongly

were

in a position
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was extended
from the Atlantic
region to the
globalization
liberalism
American
of
international
the
concepts
Pacific, however,
no longer received such willing
assent. The
deterrence
and extended
When

led by a national
of Japan was
that, sup
bureaucracy
and banks, had retained and even
ported by its trading complexes
an alternative
its prewar
position.
Japan developed
strengthened
can
one
be
termed
international
mercantil
that
economic
concept,
restoration

an alternative
security
developed
call
security"?that
"comprehensive
Japanese
power and commercial
cipally on economic
ism,

and

concept,
is, security

one

that

based

the

prin

competitiveness.5

From Economic Welfare toNational Security
In the first few years afterWorld War II, the United States hoped to
its old national
order with
its new international
support
priorities,
economic
and having
its prime emphasis
welfare
that is, with
being

minimal spending on national security. By 1949, US defense spending
had fallen to 3 percent of GNP, and itsmassive defense industry had
back

shrunk

to but a saving

remnant.

Already by that time, however, theUnited Stateswas taking official
cognizance of the Cold War. Thereafter, the Soviet acquisition of
the communist
weapons,
victory
elevated national defense once again

nuclear
War

in China,
and the Korean
to a dominant
theme in US

policy. For the first time in history, US military forces were perma
nently

stationed

abroad,

notably

inWest

Germany

and South Korea.

Military spending sprang back to high levels, ranging between 9 and
12 percent of GNP from 1954 to 1964. And the establishment of a
industrial
large defense
The US government

also

a permanent

of US policy.
an
institutionalized,
through CoCom,
on exports of weapons
and technology

base became

object

system of controls
a direct
to communist
countries.
controls were
export
Although
was
of international
CoCom
and
the
model
contradiction
liberalism,
elaborate

the antithesis of the GATT model, both were to operate side by side
in the four decades to follow.
From American Superiority to Global Competition
The extraordinarily competitive position of the US economy in the
1940s and the 1950s helped the country to pursue an active policy
overseas. It provided a healthy base for federal taxes and federal
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on extended
and it financed
deter
spending,
large-scale expenditures
the
US
of
forces
and
extensive
rence,
overseas,
deployment
military
peace, providing
foreign aid programs.
Prosperity was underwriting
the Eisenhower
administration
its familiar slogan, "peace and
with
prosperity."
When West

countries

European

and Japan

reentered

world

mar

kets in the 1950s, however, US industry felt their presence almost at
once. At first they rebuilt their old industries, including textiles, steel,
and chemicals.

shipbuilding,

Soon, however,
and electronics.

automobiles

areas, including
countries
such asWest

and Japan employed
the advantages
Germany
in their production
that
lower
and
processes,
is,
wages
than their counterparts
located within
the
equipment

of latecomers
more

into newer
they moved
In these initial phases,

modern

United States. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, US industry's
share of global markets

underwent

global trade competition,
now

process,

seemed

a severe

erosion.

To US planners,

the first dimension of the globalization

to be undermining

US national

security.

Adding to the US sense of slippage in the postwar period was the
Soviet Union's

own

in space

achievements

travel and

the expansion

of

its

formidable industries devoted to military production. That

was especially
in tanks and tactical aircraft,
expansion
pronounced
in
II.
land
the country's winning
the
battles of World War
weapons
of extended
and international
deterrence
liberalism
The conditions
about

brought

of

the second

dimension

the multinational

of the globalization
the
process,
The
US
alliance
system,
enterprise.

spread
a massive
flow of American
direct
encouraged
especially NATO,
into
into other countries,
Multina
investment
Europe.
especially
on a greater scale, and
in larger numbers,
tional enterprises
operated
in more

than ever before.

countries

was
In terms of national
that development
however,
objectives,
as having equivocal
seen by policy makers
results. The multinationals
to roam the noncom
greatly from their freedom
certainly benefited
munist

world,

national

but

there was

or economic

considerable
welfare

uncertainty
did as well.6

whether

US

security
of US-based
multinationals
subsidiaries
eventually
European
to
not
to
but also to
members
of NATO
their
sell
output
only
began
Pact. European
host governments
resisted
of the Warsaw
members
to extend
to
its export restrictions
the efforts of the US government
The
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the subsidiaries of US firms established in Europe, generating such
nasty

as

quarrels

the

over

struggle

of

the provisioning

the Soviet

pipeline in 1982.7
Multinational

globalization,
multinationals

enterprises

helped

to accelerate

a third dimension

of

the spread of high-technology capabilities. US-based
began

to acquire

components

for US weapons

systems

not only from their US plants but also from subsidiaries and
suppliers

independent

abroad.

The

new

reality was

summed

up

in

1987 by the commander of US military forces in the Pacific, Admiral
James

Lyons:

All of the critical components of our modern weapon
systems, which
our
involve our F-16s and F/A-18s, our M-l
tanks,
military comput
I could go on and on?come
from East Asian industries. I
ers?and
don't see change in that, during the foreseeable future. Some day, we
might view that with concern, and rightly so. Certainly, the East Asian
industries have really become an extension of our own military
industrial complex.8

From Military Spin-offs to Commercial Drain-off s
The institutionalization of high military spending in peacetime that
took place after the Korean War helped to establish a large defense
industrial

base,9

an

and also had
of the US

mercial

important
impact
as a whole.
economy

upon the com
But this impact

performance
change over time.
For the first decade or so, the impact of military
upon
spending
was
there
the
economic
seemed
rather
First,
positive.
performance
effect: as long as fiscal resources were
fiscal or macroeconomic

would

plentiful,

military
purchases
and
their duration

reducing
new weapons
technologies
to lift the national
economy
innovations,

for instance,

could

be sustained

even

in recessions,
on
spending

severity. Besides, military
seemed to be helping
the US government
to higher stages of development;
military

were

spun off

to support

aviation

in the

1940s and 1950s, computers in the 1950s, and semiconductors in the
1960s.
By the early 1970s, however, the benefits of military spending
upon economic performance had become dubious. The fiscal effect of
the Vietnam War had been to drive the US economy into an era of
sustained inflation.Military spending was beginning to divert inno
vators

from products

and processes

most

suited

to commercial

use to
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the more

exotic

and expensive
needs of the battlefield.
The diversion
as the
in semiconductors,
Ziegler analysis points out, and
in
other key industries
tools.
apparent
including machine

was

evident

was

also

By the early 1980s, the impact of military spending upon economic
had

performance

become

largely

The

negative.

administra

Reagan

tion undertook a new military buildup, bringing military
from 5 or 6 percent of GNP in the 1970s to 7 percent
Although the increasewas modest in relation to GNP, itwas
on top of high fiscal deficits, giving rise to the accumulation
federal

debt

in the Reagan

years

in the two preceding

than

spending
in 1985.
piled up
of more

centuries.

For a time in the 1980s, interest rates and a high valuation of the
dollar contributed to a furtherweakening of US exports in the global
market.10
One
ever,

administration's
part of the Reagan
to give some promise
seemed
of

how
program,
military
a different
result. A few

advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative hoped that it could also
serve as a US version

of the industrial

of foreign competitors,
those of Japan, thereby repeating
the role that military
particularly
contracts
had performed
earlier in the fields of aviation,
computers,
and semiconductors.
But any hope for a new golden age of military
spin-offs

to commercial

policies

competitiveness

was

extinguished

by

the

drive to hold down military spending in response to the fiscal deficit.
the four decades
of the postwar
the
through
period,
were
allies
far
less
for
purposes
country's
principal
spending
military
to the charge that they
than the United
themselves
States, exposing
were
a negative
the role of the free rider. By the 1970s,
playing
Meanwhile,

became evident between
the level of military
relationship
expenditure
in industrial
and the change
the lower the level of
competitiveness:
the stronger the competitive
The
expenditure,
military
performance.

resulting array placed West Germany and Japan at the top of the
growth league, and the United States and the United Kingdom at the
bottom.
years,

Despite
the array

some recovery
in the US performance
continued
largely unchanged.

in subsequent

The United States, itwas evident, was the linchpin in the security
system on which other countries relied afterWorld War II. Britain
were
status and military
reduced
from great power
a US-led
to
alliance.
powers within
autonomy
merely
being major
true
of dependence
This condition
upon a US defense was even more
But
of the defeated
in
and
all
these
nation-states,
Germany
Japan.
and

France
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was
of how
its national
conception
developing
was
to
the
international
This
related
economy.11
conception
security
would
its
that each government
toward
pursue
shaped the policies
industrial base.
defense
a new

countries,

BRITAIN

At the end ofWorld War II,Britain continued inmany ways to give
of a great power.

the appearance

It still governed

the largest colonial

empire in the world; was one of the big three at the Potsdam
was

conference;

one of the four victors

of
sharing in the occupation
one of the five permanent members
of the United
But the reality was quite different. Britain
Council.

and was

Germany;
Nations
Security
had been economically

exhausted

by

its wartime

as was

efforts,

revealed in July 1945, when the British government had to appeal for
a large emergency

loan

from

the United

States.

1947,

By

economic

necessity forced the British towithdraw from being themain support
of the Greek

government

in its effort

against

communist

insurgents.

led first to the Truman Doctrine and then the

Britain's withdrawal
Plan.

Marshall

For forty years thereafter,
the essence of British
an effort to sustain British interests with American
British

perspective,

the ideal "special

relationship"

policy was
power. From the
was one between

security

British ends and American means, British brains and American
was
bolstered
of
special
relationship
by a number
a
common
a
different
factors:
language and culture,
liberal-capitalist
as
as the shared
and a liberal-democratic
well
economy,
polity
two
wars
in
of
world
and
the Soviet
experiences
resisting Germany
brawn.

This

in a cold peace.
an independent
In 1952, Britain developed
nuclear
a third nuclear power.
became
But the independence

Union

deterrent
of

and

the deter

rent was only nominal. Since 1962 the British nuclear deterrent
has consisted of US-made ballistic missiles placed within British
submarines.

The policies of the British government toward the British defense
industry

have

generally

conformed

to the pattern

suggested

by the

role of junior partner in a special relationship. The British defense
budget percentage has been the second largest after that of theUnited
States, running at 4 or 5 percent of GNP. But the British market has
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not been

an efficient

to sustain

large enough

defense

industrial

base.

For many years, the British defense industry found a natural market
in the former members of the Empire, principally the sheikdoms of
the Persian Gulf. But thiswas still not enough to sustain an industry
on

the

recounts, by the late 1960s

the Moran-Mowery

the British were

with the military
aircraft
arrangements
France and West
Germany.
including

production

countries,
was
British government
for military
autonomy
country's

as

scale. Accordingly,

required

leading

relaxed

sufficiently
that it allowed

producer

of military

US

essay

engaged

in joint

industries

of other

the

By

1980s

the

to the need

with

regard
to take

firms

over

the

helicopters.12

FRANCE

At the end ofWorld War II, the gap between the appearance of great
status

power

and

the reality

of economic

was

weakness

even greater

for France than for Britain. France had also been exhausted by the
the reason

war,

but

what

had happened

lay in something
to Britain, namely,

far more
France's

than
demoralizing
defeat and occupa

tion by Germany. For a time, the personality of Charles de Gaulle as
commander

the Free

of

France.

with

French
gave the
the close of World War

illusion

of

II, France

a victorious

still governed
one of the four

Besides,
the second
empire in the world; was
largest colonial
in the occupation
of Germany;
and was one of the
powers
sharing
But
members
of the United Nations
five permanent
Security Council.
was
even
weaker
of the reality of its defeat, France
than
because
Britain

in the essentials

of economic

and military

power;

and much

of

what remained would be consumed in the long and disastrous
colonial wars in Indochina from 1945 to 1954 and inAlgeria from
1954 to 1962. Balking at every step, France nevertheless had to take
the US

its place within

security

system.

Out of office during most of these years, de Gaulle perceived this
reality clearly, andwhen he returned to power in 1958, he quickly set
about

to reverse

it. De Gaulle's

France

a reminder

summer of the nation-state,
era before World War
II and
De Gaulle
autonomy;

a sort of Indian
represented
it had been in the lost
of what

of the superpowers.
the ascendancy
was military
of the nation-state
that the keystone
an
on
nuclear
thus his insistence
force, his
independent
saw
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force de frappe, aswell as his withdrawal from the integratedNATO
structure

commanded

An

independent
base?a
industrial

this were

of

components

by an American
general.
nuclear
force, in turn, required a strong defense
French military-industrial
The
chief
complex.
a

large

aerospace

a

and

industry

large

nuclear industry; supporting it was a French defense budget that
normally has been 3 or 4 percent of GNP. But economies of scale of
course meant

that these

were

markets

would

not be efficient

France

alone

industries

than what

unless

could

their
This

larger
provide.
on the export of weapons
systems and
required a major
emphasis
to Third World
nuclear power plants, which
often went
countries,

including those in the former colonial empire and Iraq. But France
still

could

not

Accordingly,

on

industry

the

required

scale.

like Britain, France was driven to engage in joint
with

arrangements

production
countries.
Since

a weapons

sustain

the de Gaulle

the weapons

era, French

industries

governments

have

of

other

continued

give a higher priority than have Britain and West Germany
maintaining
the differences

WEST

a domestic
have

now

aerospace
shrunk

industry
to a matter

and nuclear

industry.

to

to
But

of degree.

GERMANY

BeforeWorld War II,Germany had been the ?xtreme example of the
state in Europe,
of the state applying military
"military-political"
to gain economic
was
After
World War
power
II, Germany
space.13
a
to
reduced first to being an occupied
and
nation
country
eventually
with
restricted
sovereignty.

As amilitary state, Germany had been distinguished by the superb
of its military
into an effective force. After its defeat, the
organization
its
redirected
national
for organization
and disci
country
capacity
an
and
instead
became
state."
pline
exemplary
"trading
For a number
of reasons,
the allies did not leave a centralized

bureaucracy to lead the new West Germany as they did in Japan. In
West Germany, the powers of the federal government were held in
by some basic structural
changes,
the powers of state and local governments

check

central
What

bank
was

insulated

from

left of the national

the

federal

leadership

an expansion
of
including
and the development
of a
government's
were
the same

authority.
forces that
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had

led German

in the past, the major banks
to become
returned
organizations

industrial

and

development

These

great
corporations.
forces in the German
economy,
success.
and
commercial
ciency
leading

the West

When

to economic

effi

in 1955,
it was
reestablished
army was
framework
under an American
commander.

German

into a NATO

integrated

devoted

The West German armed forces acted as if they were part of the US
army,

and had no independent

or strategic

purpose

political

doctrine.

so limited a role, West German governments succeeded in
holding down military spending to only 3 percent of GNP.
During its first decade, theWest German military bought many of

With

its weapons

from

systems
reestablished

many
remained

its own
modest

relatively
and France.

States, Britain,
and not having
the German

States.

Being too small for efficient
an ex-colonial
market
into which

available
defense

Ger
Eventually, West
one that
but it was
defense
industry,
in comparison
with
that in the United

the United

industry

even more

moved

quickly

production
to expand,
and more

completely than its British and French counterparts into joint pro
duction with the defense industries of other NATO allies.
Having made its peace with the rest of Europe, inWest Germany
no

institution

a concept

developed

of national

identity

or even

of

national security as they normally would be defined. The military had
a NATO

the banks

orientation;
or European

Market
number

of diverse

absence

of a German

and

orientation;

had a Common
corporations
had
and the bureaucracies
and

federal,
orientations?European,
was of course reinforced
orientation

that East Germany lay outside its orbit.With
a unified

German

state,

one

condition

for

a

state. This
by the fact

the advent in 1990 of
the development

of

a

distinctly German orientation was again in place. A question for the
future will be what institution or interest is likely to provide the
leadership

for a German

concept

JAPAN: THE MERCANTILIST

of national

security.

STATE

to the West German
experience:
Japan offers some striking parallels
in its efforts to use military
force to
a state that had been defeated
a
a
for
nation
with
economic
space;
organiza
high propensity
gain
to economic
tion and discipline,
ends; and a
turning that capacity
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to live comfortably
with
less than the full trappings
prepared
of national
sovereignty.
Even more
of a
than West Germany,
Japan has been the exemplar
In
only 1 percent of its GNP upon defense.
trading state, spending

nation

state to trading
state
from military
role was played by the US Occupation.

transformation
years, a crucial

Japan's
postwar

in the
The

Americans dismantled some of the central institutions of the old
army, the navy,
Japan?the
erates. Unlike
in Germany,
the centralized

dismantle
The

Japanese
assumed

which

and the zaibatsu, or industrial conglom
the occupying
did not
powers
however,

armed
some

bureaucracy.14
forces were replaced by the US armed forces,
of the roles that the Japanese military would

have performed. US forces bolstered themilitary security of Japan in
the Korean

War

and

safe passage
for Japanese
guaranteed
goods
as
as
well
Indonesian
and Middle
Eastern oil
Asia,

to Southeast

going

to Japan.
coming
its own
Without

army

and navy,

Japan

no

had

longer

its own

military strategy. By dismantling the industrial zaibatsu, if only in
had also reduced a second pillar of authority.
part, the occupation
Yet another pillar remained
from the earlier order, the bureaucracy.
on
for the actual administration
the
of Japan
By relying
bureaucracy

during the occupation, the United States had further enhanced its
role. With

remnants

of

the

still

conglomerates

in existence,

industrial structure existed that could interact effectively with
bureaucracy.

At

the conclusion

of the occupation,

the Japanese

an

the
state

was in an even better position than it had been beforeWorld War II
to lead the Japanese
society with
a modern
form of mercantilism.

a particular

vision.

That

vision was

that could have opposed
the mercantilism
of
only power
was
so.
not
to
States. But it choose
the United
do
the
Japan
Why
States did not, when
itwas promoting
United
liberalism and oppos
The

so vigorously
ing mercantilism
considerable
scholarly analysis.

United

been

the subject? of
in Asia, the

evident:

States had only one major ally to help it confront the

communist
Japan.

in Europe,
has
reason was

One

and
regimes of China
In any event, mercantilism

the Soviet
remained

Union,
intact

and

that was

in Japan,

not

showing any significant signs of change until the 1980s.
The
society

has conceived
of the state as guiding
Japanese
bureaucracy
in the global economy,
toward effective competition
for the
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of increasing

purpose

the power

of the state and

and wealth

society.

It has also regarded this competition as taking place within
context

a dynamic

of

comparative
the state's

environment,

changing

the

to the

advantage.
Responding
seen as
role has been
helping

society to move progressively higher on the ladder of technology,
industries
for those with higher productivity.
low-wage
no
could
for its national
Japan
longer provide
security
a functional
its own military,
it had to construct
equivalent,

abandoning
Because
with

using US military power and a style of low-posture diplomacy in the
of its economic
the
power. This combination
application
provided
forces supporting
the Japanese
of
concept
"comprehensive
security."
For Japan,
the US military
then, national
security has required

umbrella; but it has also required economic efficiency in the global
an objective
to which
the state has been committed.
In
meant
to
this
has
the
of
the
terms,
returning
policies
national monarchies
of two centuries
ago, that is, to mercantilism;
but it has required a much
identification
with
the interna
greater

market,
economic

tional market

than was

I have

to call

THE

chosen

SOVIET UNION:

The most

consistent

required
international

two centuries

THE MILITARY-POLITICAL
example

what

ago, producing

mercantilism.

of a military-political

STATE
state

in modern

times has been the Soviet Union. Before the Bolshevik Revolution,
Russia

had

development,
revolution,
In the view

relying
as the Davis
of

However,

some

on

extreme
state

example
direction
of

essay demonstrates,
the entire
observers,

of the pattern
of
the economy.
After
it became even more
Soviet

Union

was

late
the
so.
one

base or military-industrial
complex.
an unstable
the Soviet system represented
equilibrium.
a steady
the apparent
stability of the structure was

defense

gigantic

an

provided

industrial

Undermining
in its economic
decline

performance.

Each

successive

decade

from the

1950s to the 1980s saw a decline in the rates of economic growth of
the Soviet Union and its East European allies. And although the
Soviet Union

was

to

a

state,
military-political
trade and consumption,

rather

than one

commit

ted
this economic
failure
increasing
even
an
its political
undermined
As
it
turned
out,
legitimacy.15
state
not
test
of
the
could
avoid
the
of
the
military-political
exemplar
global

economy.
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For the Soviet bloc, the 1950s were a decade that perfectly fit the
Stalinist
"steel"
ization,

a personality
with
that had chosen
formula,
resonating
It was a decade of forced-draft
industrial
for a pseudonym.
in heavy
of rapid growth
industries such as steel, chemicals,

electricity,

shipbuilding,

of

and,

course,

all

of

weapons

sorts.

It

brought into being a large class of industrial workers, which was
the suitable mass

supposedly
Producing
Soviet state's

for communist

base
rates

annual

that often

growth
economic
impressive

to the Soviet model.

But

rule.
6 percent,

exceeded

the

gave great legitimacy
performance
was
the great project of steel communism

already reaching its limits, unable to deal effectively with the next
stage of development.

demanding

The 1960s might be called the decade of Sputnik communism,
after
Now
was

success of the Sputnik
in 1957.
space program
the emphasis was on high-technology
There
industrialization.
of higher education
and the creation of a
also a vast expansion
the dramatic

of managers

large class

and professionals.

Growth

rates

remained

high in this period, 4 to 5 percent annually, but theywere lower than
they had
growth

in the earlier

been
rates

inWestern

decade

and were

not much

above

the

Europe.

The 1970s might be called the decade of goulash communism,
after Khrushchev's
description
of a model. Now,
something

which
he saw as
Hungary,
was
on
the emphasis
consumer-goods
of Kadar's

industrialization. In order to bring this about, the Soviet bloc opened
itself

to Western

agreements,
example was
to reorganize

loans,
investments,
the first beachheads
of

and licensing
joint ventures,
the global
A prime
economy.
the giant Italian enterprise,
Fiat,

the arrangement
with
and expand Soviet production

of the Lada

automobile.

By the 1970s, the annual growth rates of the Soviet bloc had fallen
to 3 or 4 percent,
and the new standard of legitimacy was virtually
to one of the central values of the West,
identical
that of
namely,
consumerism.
marked

On

this standard,

the Soviet

bloc was

obviously

at a

disadvantage.

Finally, the 1980s might be called the decade of yuppie commu
nism.

rates of the Soviet bloc economies
By then, the annual growth
or even less. The communist
fallen to 1 or 2 percent,
regimes
were no longer able to fulfill the promise of mass
and
consumption,
to
the promise of elite consumption,
that is, consump
they retreated
tion by the "new class" of bureaucrats,
and professionals.
managers,
had
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these

Throughout

the Soviet

four decades,

continued

government

to spend 15 to 20 percent of its GNP on the military, or what
defense

Itmaintained

the "metal-eaters."

called

Khrushchev
massive

industrial

base

at the cost

of having

a
and expanded
a
feeble
only

industrial base for producing competitive goods for the global
market. But the standards of both political legitimacy and military
efficiency were steadily shifting away fromwhat the Soviets did best,
a steel economy without
building
regard for consumer
move
from low-technology,
mechanical,
mass-produced
to high-technology,
and precision weapons
electronic,

interests.

The

armaments
rep

systems

resented a shift from what the Soviets did best to what the Japanese
and the Americans did best.
led to crisis in the
these developments
As the Davis essay recounts,
state and to Gorbachev's
efforts
unsuccessful
Soviet military-political
in
Eastern
at reform. Finally,
in 1989, the communist
governments
a suddenness
and
that aston
with
completeness
Europe
collapsed

ished the world.
Each
ogy,

of globalization?markets,
technol
some
in
of enterprises?contributed
way to the

of the three dimensions

and the structure

crisis of the Soviet state and the collapse of the Soviet bloc.
The globalization of markets increased the benefits of participating
a closed

and the costs of maintaining
came a need for Western
however,

in an open

economy

foreign trade,
and a need
ments,

to be attentive

toWestern

loans

economic

bloc. With
and

invest

advice.

The globalization of high-technology capabilities widened the
margin by which Soviet technologies lagged behind those of the
United

and Western

States

Europe,

a condition

that was

disagreeable

but familiar. But it also placed Soviet technology behind that of Japan
a condition

and East Asia,

that was

and unacceptable.

unprecedented

If even South Korea could surpass the Soviet bloc in technological
the Soviet

achievement,

system was

obviously

in deep

trouble.

The globalization of enterprise structure did not mean the spread
of multinational
It did mean,

into the Soviet bloc, at least not at first.
enterprises
in capitalist
countries
of a class of
creation
the
however,

with
international,
corporate managers
a class that the bureaucratic
managers
bloc were
eager to join.
increasingly
Thus
world

it was
has

ever

even global values and styles,
in the Soviet
and professionals

the greatest military-political
seen was overcome
in the cresting
that

that the
empire
tide of globaliza
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tion. Deposing
Gorbachev,
to be still.
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leaders were

the

commanding

oceans

AFTER THE COLD WAR
Gorbachev's

efforts

to end

the Cold War

appeared
between national

to a new

to mark

the

stage in the tension
security and
The globalization
the global economy.
trend had been seen by some
as creating a serious problem
US planners
for US national
security.
transition

But with the collapse of theWarsaw Pact, the need for a US defense
base

also

seemed

greatly

reduced.

By undermining

the Soviet mili

tary-political state along with theUS national defense industrial base,
globalization
had created.

appeared

to provide

a solution

to the very problem

it

Nevertheless, with the prosecution of the war in the Persian Gulf
and the turmoil in Soviet leadership, some of the problems of
have returned
in even greater strength. Although
the
globalization
Soviet capacity
for conventional
is much
warfare
Soviet
impaired,

nuclear capabilities cannot be ignored. Nor can the possibilities be
disregarded of the appearance of new petty tyrants in the developing
world. A critical question for the future is to identify what will be
to maintain
and strengthen
the capabilities
for dealing with
such potential
threats.
Part of the answer
is crystal clear. A national
defense base can no
to
suffice
that
the Cold War
era,
longer
provide
capability.
During
the United
States and the Soviet Union,
only the two superpowers,
needed

were
have

to maintain

able

to claim

borders

been

control within
and beyond
their
enough
the existence
of a national
defense base. But both
their coercive
influence on other countries.

losing
In the future the Soviet
in

national

important

defense
ways,

industrial
but

it will

base may continue
to depend
have

to be
upon

large-scale imports of technology from the global market if it is to
have

any acceptable
degree of efficiency. The US defense base seems
to follow the trend toward progressive
destined
international
involve

ment.

The

new

industrial

defense
era, therefore, will not be the era of the national
or
even
one.
of
the
it
base,
continental,
Rather,
European

will be the era of the global defense industrial pool. This pool will be
fed by

streams

flowing

in from many

sources,

from many

nations.
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will have to be satisfied with
governments
than control of, the pool.
to this new
How
will national
governments
respond

And

access

to,

era of

the

national

rather

defense

global
new era will

industrial

pool?
not be so different

the European
the
governments,
from the old. Centuries
of experience

on
of dependence
foreign
and
For
US
firms.
the
govern
technologies,
foreign products,
foreign
to be endured
the new era will
indeed be a new experience,
ment,
have

inured

them

to

some

For

measure

with great reluctance. And for the Soviet Union, itwill be a challenge
of monumental

proportions.
any nation have real powers

Will

of coercion

over

other

govern

ments by virtue of its contributions to the global pool? The remnants
of such power will probably continue to reside in the United States
for some
candidate

time

to come.

is Japan.

There

the United
Beyond
has been some

Japan for political purposes might

the only
States,
recent speculation

other
that

try to exploit its monopoly

in

some

that are especially
desired by the US military.
But
components
between
the
and
US
the bargaining
govern
Japanese
relationship
covers many points of vulnerability
ments
for both economies.
From
in the US Defense
of planners
who
Department,
the
relative
the weapons
procurement
relationship,
in the
and their counterparts
themselves
power between

the perspective
on
concentrate
bargaining

seem troubling
at
may
government
and from the
of the US president,
perspective
components
officials, many
Japanese
bargaining
those involving weapons
beyond
relationship
on US and
include Japan's heavy dependence
Japanese

times.

But

from

the

of most
perspective
are involved
in the
procurement.

These

markets,
European
of
stake in the industries and capital markets
Japan's heavy financial
as a
continued
traditional
vulnerabilities
those areas, and Japan's
resources.
The capacity
natural
of either
crowded
island without
over
to
to
issues
continues
threaten
the
other
vital
country
effectively
decline.
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